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Cost-push influences frequently have been
cited as the cause ofshort-term increases in the
overall price level. Butthere is generalagreement
among economists that, over the long run, infla-
tion is a demand-related rather than a supply-
related phenomenon. Neither strong unions nor
oligopolistic manufacturingfirms, through their
market power, can independently generate a
sustained upward movement in prices. Unless
wage increases are validated or supported by
increased demand for labor, rising unemploy-
ment eventuallywill haltthewage-push. Similar-
ly, the efforts of sellers to widen their profit
margins, without regard to the strength of de-
mand, eventually will be frustrated by heavy
discounting from list prices.
The monetarists go a step further and argue
that inflation is always a purely monetary phe-
nomenon, that apparent cost-push influences
(even in the short run) are lagged reactions to
past excesses in monetary growth. But even the
monetarists agree that a short-run acceleration
in the rate of money growth initially stimulates
the demand not only for goods and services but
also for factor inputs. It is in this sense, with
regard to their role in transmittinginflation, that
it is useful to study the underlying "cost-push"
elements at work in the inflationary process.
This article attempts to study the role ofcosts
and capacity-utilization rates in the industrial
pricing process, and to formulate an inflation
forecast for 1977 based on a consideration of
those factors as well as the expected behavior of
farm and food prices. The first section describes
the cost-plus pricing methods most manufactur-
ing firms follow in setting their prices, and the
variables that affect the various elements ofcost.
The second and third sections compare the
behavior ofthe various cost elements during the
current recovery in U.S. economic activity with
that of previous post-war economic recoveries.
The fourth section examines the behavior of
costs and prices during 1976 in more detail, as a
prelude toward developing an inflation forecast.
Finally, in the last section we analyze what all
these considerations imply for the overall rate of
inflation in 1977.
I. Cost-Price Determination Process
Most manufacturing firms in the United
States operate in imperfectly competitive mar-
kets, where individual producers have some
control overtheprice oftheiroutputin the short-
run. They do notpassivelyacceptas a"given" the
price established by thefreely operatingforces of
supply and demand. Rather, empirical studies
have shown that most firms set their product
prices in accordance with some version of the
cost-plus principle. The central tenet of this
doctrine-also known as mark-up pricing-is
that prices perunit ofoutputare set primarilyon
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the basis of average costs of production (for
labor, materials, energy and capital) plus a
margin of profit based on some predetermined
target rate of return on investment. I Prices per
unit therefore change primarily in response to
changes in unit costs, or profit margins, rather
than in response to short-term shifts in the
demand forgoods. Ofcourse, demand influences
may be felt through variations in the profit
margin, since firms frequently increase their
markupsduringboomsand shade theirlist prices
during recessions and other periods ofdemand-
supply imbalance.
Unit labor costs, the largest cost factor, de-pend upon the hourly compensation paid work-
ers and their productivity, i.e., output per hour.
Wage-rate changes in turn depend primarily
upon the unemployment rate and the past rate of
inflation in consumer prices.2 Under the tradi-
tionalPhillips Curveconcept, the rateofincrease
in wages bears an inverse relationship to the rate
ofunemployment, which serves as a measure of
tightness in labor markets.3 For the recovery
stage of the business cycle, with unemployment
declining, the Phillips analysis thus implies an
accelerated rate of increase in compensation.
Past inflation influences wages in twoways: I)
automatically, through the operation ofcost-of-
living adjustment (COLA) clauses in labor con-
tracts and 2) through the collective-bargaining
process, as organized workers seek also to in-
crease their real wages. Because labor contracts
normally extend over several years' time, wages
are affected not only by past price behavior but
also by the expected behavior of prices during
the term of new contracts.
The second major determinant of unit labor
costs is productivity.4 Changes in labor produc-
tivity reflect two distinct forces: I) the long-term
trend in technology as reflected in the capi-
tal!output ratio and 2) short-term cyclical fluc-
tuations in output and the capacity-utilization
rate.s
Other direct costs of production include the
costs of materials and energy. The costs of
industrial raw materials-such as cotton, hides,
natural rubber, and metalscrap-dependlargely
upon prices determined in highly competitive
markets, where changes in demand lead toquick
adjustments. Consequently, their prices tend to
show a higher degree of cyclical volatility than
prices for products at laterstages ofthe produc-
tion process. Highly processed materials, suchas
steel and aluminum, in contrast are priced in
oligopolistic markets in accordance with the
cost-plus principles outlined here. Higher prices
for these products affect the costs incurred by
manufacturers of finished products such as au-
tomobiles and appliances, encouraging them to
raise their product prices. The costs of energy,
which have risen sharply (both absolutely and
relatively) in recent years, are determined pri-
marily by OPEC cartel's actions in setting the
world price of oil and by the Federal Power
Commission's actions in regulating interstate
natural-gas prices.
II. Cost Behavior During Previous
Recoveries
How do these cost elements behave during the
recovery phase of the typical business cycle? A
review of five cyclical recoveries (prior to the
1973-75 period) shows that hourly-
compensation growth typically increases gradu-
ally as the recovery progresses, presumably in
response to both a decline in the rate ofunem-
ployment and a speed-up in the rate ofinflation
(Chart I-A). Output per labor-hour typically
rises sharply during the early stages of the re-
covery, when capital and labor are both under-
utilized and output can be expanded without
commensurate growth in aggregate hours by
fuller resource utilization (Chart I-B).6 In con-
trast, output per labor-hour normally slows
during the more advanced stages ofthe business
recovery, as plant capacity becomes more fully
utilized and output expansion becomes difficult
even with increased inputs of labor.
The rapid rise of productivity early in the
expansion, combined with a relatively moderate
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rateofincrease incompensation, typicallycauses
unit labor costs to stabilize or even decline
(Chart I-C). Later in the recovery, with slowing
productivity and accelerating compensation,
unit labor costs tend to rise ata more rapid rate.
On the raw material side, industrial raw-
material prices typically begin to turn upward
about a quarter before the cyclical low in general
business activity, as manufacturers begin to
rebuild theirmaterials inventories in preparation
for increased production. These prices tend to
rise slowly, then more rapidly, and then more
slowly again in response to a slower growth of
production and inventory accumulation. Final-
ly, late in the expansion period, the rate of
increase in prices begins to accelerate again as
buyers begin to react to expectations of short-
ages (Chart 2-A).7 Reflecting these price move-
ments, raw material costs per unit ofoutputtend
to fluctuate in the same manner over the course
of each cyclical expansion. Energy prices (andenergy unit costs) in contrast remain relatively
stable untilthelaterstages ofthetypical recovery
(Chart 2-B)-although not ofcourse in the most
recent recovery.
Those manufacturing industries producing
industrial materials-particularly highly-proc-
essedmaterials such as steel, aluminum, and
paper----.,tend tobethefirst toexperiencecapacity
bottlenecksas therecoverymatures. Demandfor
these materials is bolstered notonlyby increased
consumption but also by inventory accumula-
tion (as a hedge against possible shortages and
Chart 1
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to rise faster than the production of finished
productssuch as automobiles.Thus,atanygiven
stage of the expansion, the capacity-utilization
rate in the basic material (primary processing)
industries tends to be higher than for the manu-
facturing sector as a whole (Chart 3).8
This survey of pre-1973 business cycles indi-
cates that total costs per unit of production
generally rise ata relatively slow fate early inthe
recovery, whenoutputis rising relatively rapidly,
and ata faster rate as the recovery matures. But
atthat advanced stage ofthe expansion, excess
demand pressures relative to available supply
cause widespread capacity bottlenecks in the
basicmaterial industries, exertingstrongupward
pressure on industrial prices.
III. Cost Behavior During the Current
Recovery
Unit labor costs, the dominant cost element,
have followed the typical pattern during the
recovery from the severe 1973-75 recession
(Chart I-A). Duringthe first two quarters ofthe
recovery, unit labor costs in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector actually declined sharply, and thus
offset much ofthe increase in costs thathas since
occurred. Meanwhile, the rate of increase in
hourly compensation slowed during the first two
quarters of the recovery, accelerated in early
1976 and then settled back again. This suggests
that the rising unemployment rate during the
first halfof 1975 and the latter halfof 1976 acted
to moderate the rate ofincrease in wages during
those periods.
Productivity also has followed the expected
cyclical pattern (Chart I-B), growing fastest
during the early stages of the recovery and then
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25rising at a more moderate rate. But throughout
most of the current recovery, the growth of
productivity has been above average for compa-
rable stages of the business cycle, due to the
comparativelylow capacity-utilizationrates pre-
vailing during this business upswing. Gains in
productivity thus have provided a larger than
normal offset to rises in compensation, moderat-
ing the upward pressure on industrial prices
stemming from rising unit labor costs. In fact,
the exceptional growth of productivity during
the first two quarters of the recovery actually
acted, along with the deceleration in the growth
of hourly compensation, to reduce unit labor
costs.
Rawmaterialpricesalso have tended tofollow
the expected pattern-rising relatively slowly
and then more rapidly until the "pause" ofmid-
1976, which reduced the demand for industrial
raw materials and moderated their prices (Chart
2-A). Energy prices, on the other hand, failed to
follow the typical pattern, since OPEC actions
caused a greater rate of increase during the
recession than during the recovery (Chart 2-13).
This rise in energy prices undoubtedly acted to
offset some ofthe benefits ofthe early-recovery
declinein unit Jabor costs.
Total unit costs consequently rose at a rela-
tively modest rate during the early stages ofthe
recovery, when laborcosts were declining. Total
costs then followed roughly the same pattern
during the first half of 1976, before accelerating
because ofrapidly rising laborand energy costs.
Despite this gradual acceleration, costs still rose
far less on an annual basis in 1976 than in 1975,
due tothe verylargeincreaserecorded duringthe
late-recession period of early 1975.
Industrial prices have generally paralleled the
cyclical movements in costsduringthis recovery,
but the overall increase inpriceshas beengreater
than the rise in unit labor costs (Charts l-Cand
4). This pattern suggests that manufacturing
firms have been attemptingto restore theirprofit
margins to more acceptable levels after seeing
those margins narrow during the preceding re-
ceSSlOn.
Chart 3

































26IV. A Closer look at 1976
Chart 4
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INDUSTRIAL PRICES
prices was onlyafraction ofthe 1974 peakfigure.
The wholesale price index also decelerated in
1976 (Table I). The farm and processed-food
component actually declined slightly, acting to
moderate the upward pressure on retail food
prices. Industrial commodities, which account
for more than three-fourths of the total index,
rose 6.3 percent for the year-again, only a
fraction ofthe earlier peak rate. Slower rates of
increase were widespread among most major
categories, including not only fuels but also
metals, chemicals, and paper. Inflation speeded
up again in late 1976, but slack demand condi-
tions, especially for highly processed basicmate-
rials, led to widespread discounting from pub-
lished list prices. Thus, the acceleration in
realized prices was less thanfor theposted prices
which make up the industrial price index.
Moderate labor pressures
Reductions in labor cost pressures helped
account for the deceleration in industrial prices.
In 1976, unit labor costs in the private nonfarm
business sector rose by only 3.6 percent-again
only a fraction of the earlier peak (Table 2).
When 1976 opened, it was expected that hourly
compensation would rise by at least 10 percent,
orslightly more than in 1975, as organized labor
sought to compensate for the priordecline in its
real wages attributable to sharply rising living
costs. Most of the contracts expiring had been
negotiated in 1973, whenwageand pricecontrols
were still in effect.
Although the settlements in the automobile,
electrical equipment, trucking and rubberindus-
tries turned out to be relatively high, the average
first-year increase in compensation amounted to
a relatively low 8.3 percent for all new major
contracts with COLA provisions. Moreover, the
wages of nonunion workers rose at an even
slower rate, so that the increase in hourly com-
pensation for all workers in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector(includingcost-of-livingadjustments)
averaged 7.4 percent.
Even more importantin moderatinglaborcost
pressures was the solid growth in productivity.
Output per labor-hour increased in the nonfarm
business sector by a healthy 3.7 percent after



















Prices rose at a slowerpace in 1976thanatany
time since 1972, when wage and price controls
hid the actual cost pressures underlying the
economy. The GNPdeflator, the broadestmeas-
ure of price change, rose at an average annual
rate of 5.1 percent-about one-half the rate
reached during the peak inflationary period of
1974 (Table I). Actually, the inflation rate accel-
erated during the course ofthe year, butthe late-
year increasewas atleastpartlydueto the impact
of a Federal pay increase.
Food and energy were largely responsible for
the 1976 price improvement, but prices for man-
ufactured products also rose ata more moderate
pace. The food componentofthe consumerprice
index rose by only3.3 percent-thesmallestgain
since 1971. Energy prices at first declined as a
result of a legislated rollback of domestic oil
prices, but they later accelerated again; still, the
7.I-percent annual increase in household energy
27Table 1
Behaviorof Major PriceJndice$, 1970-77
(Percent change, at seasonally adjusted annual rates)
GNP Deflator Consumer Price Index Wholesale Price Index
Farm Products & Industrial
All Items All Items Processed Foods Commodities
1970 5.4 5.9 3.7 3.4 3.8
1971 5.1 4.3 3.2 2.0 3.6
1972 4.3 3.3 4.6 7.6 3.4
1973 5.8 6.2 13.1 30.0 6.8
1974 10.0 11.0 18.9 11.5 22.2
1975 9.3 9.1 9.2 3.8 11.5
1976 5.1 5.8 4.6 -0.6 6.3
1975
I 8.5 8.3 -2.1 -19.3 5.8
II 4.3 6.2 3.3 7.6 1.7
III 7.0 8.3 7.9 14.1 5.3
IV 7.1 6.5 9.2 3.9 11.5
1976
1 3.2 4.7 -0.7 -16.2 4.9
II 5.2 4.5 4.5 11.6 3.3
III 4.4 3.6 3.6 -7.7 7.5
IV 5.8 4.4 7.6 -0.7 10.2
1977
I 5.8 8.6 8.5 16.5 6.6
Source: GNP deflator: U.S. Department ofCommerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; consumer and wholesale price indexes:
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 2
Changes in Productivity, labor Costs and Industrial Prices, 1974-77
(Percent change, at seasonally adjusted annual rate)
Compensation Output Unit Industrial
per hour· per hour· Labor costs· Prices··
1974 9.3 -3.5 13.2 22.2
1975 9.5 1.6 7.7 11.5
1976 7.4 3.7 3.6 6.3
1975
I 11.6 1.l lOA 5.8
II 7.1 11.8 -4.2 1.7
III 6.4 8.9 -2.3 5.3
IV 5.8 -2.8 8.9 11.5
1976
1 9.0 5.4 3.4 4.9
II 7.7 404 3.2 3.3
III 7.1 2.7 4.3 7.5
IV 7.0 -1.2 8.3 10.2
1977
I 10.2 2.6 7.3 6.6
*Private nonfarm business sector.
**Industrial commodity component, wholesale price index.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
28and thus helped account for the modest 3.6-
percent increase in unit laborcosts. Productivity
growth weakened as the recovery progressed in
1976, and actually declined slightly during the
final quarter, but that sluggishness was attribut-
able not to capacity restraint but to a temporary
slowdown in industrial production.
In retrospect, it is clear that wage increases in
1976 were moderated by the 1975 slowdown in
inflation, which held down newly negotiated
wage demands-and by the further price slow-
down thatoccurredin 1976, which held downthe
increases granted all workers under contracts
with COLA provisions. Slower wage increases,
in combination with above-average productivity
gains, then helped dampen the increase in unit
labor costs in a way thathelped cooltheinflation
rate even more. Similarly, the slower rate of
increase in energy prices and unit energy costs
helped to moderate the increase in industrial
prices.
Moderate capacity pressures
Capacity restraints posed little threat to the
overall price level in 1976. According to newly
revised Federal Reserve statistics, the rate of
capacity utilization in manufacturing reached 81
percent by the final quarter of1976. This figure,
although substantially above the cyclical low of
71 percent, was still about 7 percentage points
below the 1973 peak, when shortages and pro-
duction delays generated intense upward price
measures.9 In the materials industries, where
shortages had been most intense, the 80-percent
operating rate oflate 1976 was a full 13 percent-
age points below the 1973 peak. Only the chemi-
cal, energy and paper industries-with capacity
utilization rates ranging from 83 to 88 percent-
were operating at above-average rates.
In raising prices last year, manufacturers at-
tempted not only to recover increased costs but
also to achieve the higher rate ofreturn required
to finance necessary expansion in plant and
Table 3
Profits Per Dollar of Sales, by Industry, 1974-76
(Cents)
1976
1974 1975 1976 I II III IV
(After taxes)
All Manufacturing Corporations 5.5 4.6 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.3 5.0
Durable Manufacturing Corporations 4.7 4.1 5.2 4.8 5.8 5.0 5.0
Basic Material Industries 5.5 4.2 4.4 3.4 5.2 4.7 3.9
Primary metal industries 6.6 4.3 3.9 3.5 4.8 3.9 3.5
Iron & steel 6.4 5.0 4.1 3.8 4.8 3.9 3.8
Nonferrous metals 7.0 3.1 3.6 3.1 4.7 3.7 2.9
Fabricated metal products 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 5.3 4.9 4.1
Stone, clay & glass products 4.5 3.7 5.0 2.3 6.2 6.2 4.6
Other Durable Manufacturing 4.3 4.1 5.5 5.2 6.1 5.1 5.5
Nondurable Manufacturing Corporations 6.4 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.6 5.0
Petroleum & Coal Products 12.8 7.7 8.5 8.7 9.0 8.3 8.0
Basic Material Industries 5.9 4.2 5.0 5.6 5.7 4.7 4.1
Industrial chemicals 8.4 6.9 6.9 7.8 7.6 6.7 5.5
Textile mill products 2.5 1.5 2.4 3.0 2.9 2.0 1.6
Paper & allied products 7.0 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.7 5.7 4.7
Rubber & plastic products 5.0 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.5 2.8 4.0
Other Nondurable Manufacturing 4.1 4.4 4.5 3.9 4.8 5.2 4.1
Source: Federal Trade Commission, "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining and Trade Corporations."
29equipment. Many firms. were still tryingtQover-
come financial problems generated bythereces-
siqn. .M!etals andotherbasicmaterialsilldustries
hadbeenespeciallyhardhit, becausethedemand
fort4eir products was adverselyaffectedIlot
only by.the consumption slowdownibut also by
the ..inventory liquidation which continued to
depressoTders even after consuming industries
had begun to recover. For example, steel-mill
ProdlCH:;tshipments dropped 28. percent during
1975, and nonferrous metals experiencedsimilar
declines.
'These industries thus were unable to pass on
all of their higher costs in 1975, and as a result,
PfQfitmargins and rates ofreturn on investment
dropped sharply. For some, the slippage even
continued into 1976 (Tables 3 and 4). During
tl1efirstquarter of lQ76,after-taxprofits per
dQl1ar Qfsalesin the primary metals industries
amountedto only.3.5. cents~lessthanone ...half
themid...19741evel and less than the 5.2-percent
averagereturn earned currently by all mallufac-
tl1ringfirms.• Similarly, their return on stOck...
holders' equitywas only 7.1 percent--abol1toIle-
third of the mid-1974 figure and far below the
13.3-percent average return earned currently by
all IllaIlllfacturing firms. Their rates Qfretl1rn
rose sharply during the second quarter when
demand.conditions improved, butmarginserod-
edsomewhat.again during the last half·of the
year, despite a spate ofpublished priceincreases,
as weak demand conditions reduced sales and
undermined list prices.
Table 4
Annual Rates of Return on Stockholders' Equity, by Industry, 1974-76
(Percent)
1976
1974 1975 1976 I II III IV
(After taxes)
All Manufacturing Corporations 14.9 11.6 13.9 13.3 15.7 13.7 13.1
Durable Manufacturing Corporations 12.6 10.3 13.6 12.3 16.0 12.9 13.3
Basic Material Industries 15.2 9.9 11.0 7.1 13.6 11.8 9.5
Primary metal industries 16.5 8.6 8.2 7.1 10.7 8.1 7.1
Iron & steel 17.0 10.9 9.0 8.1 11.3 8.7 7.9
Nonferrous metals 15.7 4.9 6.8 5.3 9.5 7.0 5.5
Fabricated metal products 16.0 13.2 15.3 15.0 17.7 15.8 12.9
Stone, clay & glass products 10.6 8.5 12.0 4.8 15.5 16.1 11.1
Other Durable Manufacturing 11.4 10.5 14.8 13.7 17.1 13.4 14.9
Nondurable Manufacturing Corporations 17.1 12.9 14.2 14.3 15.5 14.4 12.9
Petroleum & Coal Products 21.1 12.5 14.3 14.7 14.8 14.0 13.9
Basic Material Industries 15.0 9.7 12.5 13.7 14.7 11.4 9.0
Industrial chemicals 17.6 11.0 14.2 16.2 16.3 13.5 11.0
Textile mill products 7.9 4.3 8.0 10.0 10.1 6.6 5.3
Paper & allied products 17.7 12.6 13.7 14.5 16.3 13.6 10.9
Rubber & plastic products 14.4 8.0 10.8 10.6 13.4 7.6 11.4
Other Nondurable Manufacturing 15.0 15.2 15.3 14.3 16.4 16.6 13.8
Source: Federal Trade Commission, "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining and Trade Corporations."
30V.Higher Inflation in 19771
In 1977, as demand conditions improve suffi-
ciently to support higher prices, producers of
some basic materials such as steel undoubtedly
will raise their posted prices in a further effort to
offset rising costs and improve profit margins.
Thehighercostofthese products in turnwill lead
to higher prices for manymanufacturedgoodsin
which those materials are utilized. This does not
mean, however, that wholesale industrial prices
will risesignificantlyabovethe 6.3-percentfigure
registered in 1976. Based ontheexpectedgrowth
of.demand, bottleneck pressures are likely to
develop in only a few manufacturing industries
over the course of the year, while near-term
prospects for unitlaborcostsand energycosts do
not appear as worrisome as they did during the
weather-caused supply problems of early 1977.
Similarly, the prospect ofamplesupplies ofmost
farm products points to only about a one
percentage-point increase in food-price infla-
tion, despite recent problems caused by the
Eastern freeze and the Western drought. Alto-
gether, thesefactors suggesta moderateaccelera-
tion in the overall inflation rate in 1977 as a
whole.
Moderate increase in labor pressures
Unit labor costs in the private nonfarm busi-
ness sector may rise about 4 or 5 percent this
year, compared to the 3.6-percent increase of
1976. An increase ofthat magnitudeseems likely
on the basis ofa modest 2-to-3 percent increase
in laborproductivity, along with a 7-percent rise
in hourly compensation. Normally, labor
compensation would rise at a faster rate at this
stage of a mature expansion, but the increase
could be dampened by the improvement in the
inflation rate that already occurred in 1976.
This year, as in 1976, the collective bargaining
calendar is extremely heavy.1O Major contracts
covering nearly 5 million workers areexpiringin
a number of important industries-including
coal, petroleum refining, steel, aluminum and
construction. On the basis of the agreement
recently reached in the first ofthose industries-
steel-it seems likely that the overall increase in
compensation for all workers in nonfarm busi-
ness will be close to the 7.4-percent increase
recorded in 1976.
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The early-1977 price upsurge would suggest
upward pressure on wage negotiations from the
recent price escalation,.hut little of this was
evident in the steel agreement, which was settled
about as expected with an 8.3-percent first-year
increase and an average 5-percent annual in-
crease over the life of the contract. Again, the
significant improvement in the unemployment
rate would suggest further upward pressure on
laborcompensation-exceptforthefact thatthe
jobless rate, presently hovering around 7.3 per-
cent, is still abnormally high for this stage ofthe
recovery. In 1977 also, fewer workers will be
involved in negotiations who are not already
covered by cost-of-living adjustment provisions.
In fact, two-thirds of the workers covered by
expiring contracts have been protected by
COLA provisions, and thusfrom atleastsome of
the effects of inflation, during the past three
years.
Productivity growth in the nonfarm business
sector probably will drop below the 1975 figure
of3.7 percent, reflecting the tendency for plant-
utilization rates to increase in the laterstages ofa
business recovery. However, productivity
growth may remain above normal, because there
is still less pressure on capacity-utilization rates
than at the same point of previous recoveries.
The relatively strong first quarter per-
formance-a 2.6-percent rate of increase in
output per labor-hour in the nonfarm business
sector-in the face of severe weather problems
suggests grounds for optimism in this regard. In
any event, ifproductivity grows by 2to 3percent
and laborcompensation rises at a 7-percent rate,
the increase in unit labor costs could be held to 4
or 5 percent.
Shortages posed by capacity restraints do not
appear to be a majorthreat.Ifindustrialproduc-
tion rises (asexpected) by 6percentthis year, and
if manufacturing capacity increases by 3 percent
(in line with past plant-equipment spending
trends), the capacity-utilization rate in manufac-
turing will rise only gradually from 81 to 84
percent-still quite low in comparison with the
peak operating rates reached in 1973. Thus the
supply situation generally should be quite easy,
with only a few exceptions suchas paper. Infact,
with the continuation of present trends in pro-duction and capacitygrowth, bottlenecks would
notbe likelytohamperproductionuntilwell into
1978.
Energy and raw material inputs
J:tnergy prices are likely to rise at a somewhat
faster rate than.had been expected before severe
we<lther conditions abnormally increased the
winter demand for heating fuels. Prior to the
onsetpfthefreeze, energy experts were predict-
ing a 6- to 7-percent rise in prices offuels and
rela.ted products about the same rate as in
1976. 11 These estimates took into account the
OPEC-imposed increase in the price ofimported
crude oil at the beginning of the year.
These forecasts are now considered to be a
little low. To help alleviate thenatural-gasshort-
age in freeze-affected areas, Congress passed
legislation calling for the removal of price con-
trols (through July) on emergency sales ofnatu-
ral gas in interstate markets. However, the
amount of gas involved in these "emergency"
sales is only a small percentage of the total
market, so that little additional price pressure
should result. Altogether, energy prices may not
rise more than 7Yz percent this year, assuming
some pressure from that source and from the
initial implementation of the Administration's
energy program. Still, an increase ofthatmagni-
tude would raise energy costs per unit ofoutput
in manufacturing-and the overall rate of
inflation-by rather modest amounts.
Industrialraw-materialpricesaccelerated dur-
ing the first quarter of 1977, reaching a point 15
percent higher than a year earlier. Someincrease
in prices is normal for this stage ofthe recovery,
but the recent upsurge has been aggravated by
this spring's "snap back" in industrial produc-
tion, which followed the late 1976 pause and
subsequent weather-induced slowdown. As pro-
duction returns to its normal growth trend,
industrial raw-material prices should rise at a
slower rate, and, as a result, the rise in unit raw-
material costs may parallel last year's increase.
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Fatnriandfood prices
I'lleQverall rate pfinflation this year will of
coursereflectCllanges infarm andfood prices as
well as the changes in industrialprices discussed
above.·iPrior tothe advent ofthe recent drought
alldfreeze,food prices were not expected to bea
major source of inflationary pressure. Indeed,
theD.S. Department of Agriculture early this
year was predicting a 3- to 4-percent rise in the
foodcomp.onentoftheCPI,notmuchmorethan
in1976.'2 But the USDA laterraised theforecast
to flle 4- to 6-percent range, as a result of the
sharp increase in fruit and vegetables prices
caused.. by California's drought and Florida's
freeze. 13.yetwith onlyfew exceptions, thesupply
prospects formost major products remain quite
favorable.
In the case of meat (particularly beef), the
supply conditions that led to lower prices last
year are unlikely to persist throughout 1977.
Favorable ratios of livestock to feed prices in
1975 resulted in large increases in meat produc-
tion in 1976. The resulting addition to supplies
helped depress prices, but the ensuing reduction
in cattle numbers then set the stage for higher
beef prices in the latter part of this year. But
continued large supplies ofpork and poultry are
expected todampen the overall increase in retail
meat prices.
Most observers predict significantly higher
prices for fresh fruits and vegetables-and of
course sharply higher prices fOf coffee. Indeed,
most ofthe acceleration in the inflation in farm
and food prices during the first quarter was
attributable to these products. But prices for
fresh vegetables already have begun to decline,
so that the annual increase in fresh fruit and
vegetable prices should be less than in the first
quarter. Moreover, prices of cereal products
should remain relatively stable on an annual
basis because ofample supplies ofthe principal
foodgr<lins, wheat and rice. Indeed, heavy U.S.
outputofthese crops in 1976allowedsubstantial
rebuilding ofstocks. Similarly, milk production
isexpected to continueathigh levels, creatingthe
possibility of some weakness in prices.costs, and the expected lev~l of capacity-
utilization rates in manufacturing. Meanwhile,
the favorable supply outlook for most agricul-
tural products, in conjunction with the effects of
recent weather problems, suggests a one-
percentage point greater increase than last year
in farm and food prices. Our overall analysis of
the expected behavior of manufacturing costs
and farm and food prices, together with its
implications for the expected behavior of the
wholesale and consumer price indexes, sugg~sts
that the GNP deflator will increase about5.5-6.0
percent in 1977, only moderately faster than the
5.I-percent rate recorded last year.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Inthis article, we examinedthetypicalcyclical
behavior of industrial prices, and presented
projections of future price behavior based on
cost-push and capacity factors. Industrial com-
modities not·only account for three-quarters of
the weight ofthe wholesale-priceindex, buttheir
prices are also the major determinant of prices
for nonfood items sold at the retail level. To
round out the inflation outlook, we also ana-
lyzed the expected behavior of farm and food
prices at the wholesale and retail levels.
Our analysis suggests that the increase in
industrialprices will not be muchhigherthan last
year's 6.3-percent figure, judging from the ex~
pected behavior of labor, material and energy
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